Research - Security

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Security research at CAIDA includes analysis of network-based attacks
e.g. denial-of-service attacks, data hosting and provision, and
measurement and statistical analysis of the trends and impact that
certain Internet worms and viruses have on the global network
infrastructure. We hope to develop meaningful and up-to-date
quantitative characterizations of attack activity and to produce
fundamental insights into the nature of malicious behavior on the
Internet and consequently the best directions for mitigating that
behavior.
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Infrastructure
Malicious Activity Analysis
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Title |
Date |
Author(s) |
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Virus
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The Nyxem Email Virus: Analysis and Inferences |
February 11, 2006
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Moore, David Shannon, Colleen |
We estimate that between 469,507 and 946,835
computers in more than 200 countries were infected by the
Nyxem/Blackworm virus between January 15 23:40:54 UTC 2006
and Wednesday February 1 05:00:12 UTC. At least 45,401 of
the infected computers were also compromised by other forms
of spyware or bot software.
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Worm
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Spread of the Witty Worm |
March 25, 2004
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Shannon, Colleen Moore, David |
A joint effort of CAIDA and UC San Diego CSE
At 8:45:18pm PST on March 19, 2004, the UCSD
network telescope received its first Witty worm packet. In
contrast to previous worms, we observed 110 hosts infected
in the first ten seconds, and 160 at the end of 30 seconds.
Witty infected only about a tenth as many hosts than the
next smallest widespread Internet worm. Where SQL Slammer
infected between 75,000 and 100,000 computers, the vulnerable
population of the Witty worm was only about 12,000 computers.
Although researchers have long predicted that a fast-probing
worm could infect a small population very quickly, Witty
is the first worm to demonstrate this capability. Witty
was also the first widely propagated Internet worm to carry
a destructive payload, represents the shortest known interval
between vulnerability disclosure and worm release -- it
began to spread the day after the ISS vulnerability was
publicized.
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DoS Attack
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SCO Offline from Denial-of-Service Attack |
December 11, 2003
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Moore, David Shannon, Colleen |
Around 2:50 AM PST Thursday morning, December 11,
the attacker(s) began to attack SCO's ftp (file transfer
protocol) servers in addition to continuing the web server
attack. Together www.sco.com and ftp.sco.com experienced a
SYN flood of over 50,000 packet-per-second early Thursday
morning. By mid-morning Thursday (9 AM PST), the attack
rate had reduced considerably to around 3,700 packets per
second. Throughout Thursday morning, the ftp server received
the brunt of the attack, although the high-intensity attack
on the ftp server lasted for a considerably shorter duration
than the web server attack. In spite of rumors that SCO
has faked the denial-of-service attack to implicate Linux
users and garner sympathy from its critics, UCSD's Network
Telescope received more than 2.8 million response packets
from SCO servers, indicating that SCO responded to more
than 700 million attack packets over 32 hours.
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Worm
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Analysis of the Sapphire Worm |
January 31, 2003
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Moore, David Paxson, Vern Savage, Stefan Shannon, Colleen Staniford, Stuart Weaver, Nicholas |
A joint effort of CAIDA, ICSI, Silicon Defense, UC Berkeley EECS and UC San Diego CSE
The Sapphire Worm was the fastest computer worm
in history. As it began spreading throughout the Internet,
it doubled in size every 8.5 seconds. It infected more than
90 percent of vulnerable hosts within 10 minutes.
The worm (also called Slammer) began to infect hosts slightly
before 05:30 UTC on Saturday, January 25.
The worm infected at least 75,000 hosts, perhaps
considerably more, and caused network outages and such
unforeseen consequences as canceled airline flights,
interference with elections, and ATM failures
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Worm
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CAIDA Analysis of Code-Red |
July 25, 2001
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Moore, David Shannon, Colleen Brown, Jeffery |
On July 19, 2001 more than 359,000 computers were
infected with the Code-Red (CRv2) worm in less than 14
hours. At the peak of the infection frenzy, more than 2,000
new hosts were infected each minute. 43% of all infected
hosts were in the United States, while 11% originated in
Korea followed by 5% in China and 4% in Taiwan. The .NET
Top Level Domain (TLD) accounted for 19% of all compromised
machines, followed by .COM with 14% and .EDU with 2%. We
also observed 136 (0.04%) .MIL and 213 (0.05%) .GOV hosts
infected by the worm. An animation of the geographic expansion
of the worm is available.
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CAIDA makes available a number of datasets for researchers
who wish to study data collected at the UCSD Network
Telescope.
- Denial-of-Service Attack Backscatter
- Worms
Much of this work was done in collaboration with Geoff Voelker
and Stefan Savage in the UCSD
Department of Computer Science and Engineering. Feedback
provided by members of Team
Cymru has been invaluable to our security research program.
CAIDA is a part of the San Diego Supercomputer Center
on the campus of the University
of California, San Diego.
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